R. v. D. (S.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 161
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant
v.
Stephen D., Paul C., Wayne B., Wayne S.,
Wayne H. and Otis R. Respondents
Indexed as: R. v. D. (S.)
File No.: 22563.
1992: June 4.
Present: Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Constitutional law ‑‑ Charter of Rights ‑‑ Trial within a reasonable time ‑‑ Young offenders ‑‑ Societal interest in prompt proceedings against young offenders merely one of factors to be balanced ‑‑ Time required for application for transfer to adult court part of inherent time requirements under Young Offenders Act ‑‑ Transfer application must be made within reasonable time ‑‑ Delay in this case not unreasonable.
Cases Cited
Applied: R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771; referred to: R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 225, 48 O.A.C. 1, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 173, 6 C.R. (4th) 96, setting aside convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement and entering stays. Appeal allowed.
C. Jane Arnup, for the appellant.
Timothy E. Breen, for the respondent Stephen D.
Peter J. Connelly, for the respondent Paul C.
Michelle K. Fuerst, for the respondents Wayne B. and Wayne S.
Carolyn L. MacDonald, for the respondent Wayne H.
Thomas J. P. Carey, for the respondent Otis R.
//Lamer C.J.//
The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by
Lamer C.J. ‑‑ The Court is ready to hand down judgment. The judgment will be pronounced by Mr. Justice Sopinka.
//Sopinka J.//
Sopinka J. ‑‑ This appeal as of right raises the issue of the application to proceedings under the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1, of the principles recently expressed by this Court in R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, released March 26, 1992. While the societal interest recognized in R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, and affirmed in R. v. Morin, requires that account be taken of the fact that charges against young offenders be proceeded with promptly, it is merely one of the factors to be balanced with others in the manner set out in R. v. Morin. Applying those factors, we agree with the conclusion of the trial judge that the delay complained of was not unreasonable. We agree with the conclusion of Catzman J.A. in the Court of Appeal that the time required for an application for transfer to adult court and appeals relating thereto is part of the inherent time requirements of a case under the Young Offenders Act. The application for transfer must, however, be made within a reasonable time and pursued meritoriously and in good faith. In this case, the trial judge found that the application could not have reasonably proceeded faster. As did Catzman J.A., we see no reason to disturb this finding. The respondents quite properly conceded that the delay from January 12, 1989 to June 5, 1989 was not unreasonable.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Ontario is set aside and the case is remitted to the Court of Appeal for disposition of the other issues.
Judgment accordingly.
Solicitor for the appellant: The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondent Stephen D.: Rosen, Fleming, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondent Paul C.: Danson & Zucker, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondents Wayne B. and Wayne S.: Gold & Fuerst, Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent Wayne H.: Carolyn L. MacDonald, Newmarket.
Solicitors for the respondent Otis R.: Carey & Froud, Mississauga.