SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175
Date: 1982-01-26
The Attorney General of Nova Scotia and Ernest Harold Grainger Appellants;
and
Linden MacIntyre Respondent; and
The Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General for Ontario, the Attorney General of Quebec, the Attorney General for New Brunswick, the Attorney General of British Columbia, the Attorney General for Saskatchewan and the Attorney General for Alberta Interveners;
and
Canadian Civil Liberties Association Intervener.
File No.: 16045.
1981: February 3; 1982: January 26.
Present: Laskin C.J. and Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR NOVA SCOTIA
Criminal law — Search warrants — Right to inspect search warrants and informations on which search warrants based — Whether access restricted to "interested parties" or open to general public — Whether right to inspect only on execution of search warrant or whether hearings dealing with search warrants open — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 443, 446.
Respondent, an investigative journalist, was denied access to search warrants and supporting material by appellant Grainger, the Justice of the Peace who had issued them, because such material was not available for inspection by the general public. At trial, respondent was held entitled to a declaration that search warrants after their execution, and the informations related to them in the control of the justice of the peace or court official, were court records available for examination by members of the general public. In dismissing an appeal, the Appeal Court declared that the public was entitled to inspect informations upon which search warrants were issued pursuant to s. 443 of the Criminal Code, and that any member of the public, including individuals
[page 176]
about to be the subject of a search warrant, was entitled to be present in open court when the search warrants were issued.
Held (Martland, Ritchie, Beetz and Estey JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed.
Per Laskin C.J. and Dickson, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ.: After a search warrant has been executed, and objects found during the search are brought before a justice, members of the public are entitled to inspect the warrant, and the information upon which it was issued. Curtailment of public accessibility is justified only where the need to protect other social values is of superordinate importance. In cases where a search warrant is issued but nothing is found, protection of the innocent is such an overriding social value. Furthermore, the public interest in the effective administration of justice must override public accessibility to the extent that the proceedings at which the warrant is issued can be conducted in camera. Otherwise a person whose property was to be searched could remove the goods. The need for confidentiality disappears, however, once the warrant has been executed. At this point the public as well as those who are directly interested have a right to inspect the warrant and the related information.
Per Martland, Ritchie, Beetz and Estey JJ. (dissenting): The broad declaration of the Court of Appeal, for reasons given by Dickson J., cannot be sustained. Respondent cannot assert a right to examine the search warrants and related informations on the basis that the issuance of the search warrants was a judicial act in open court with a right for the public to be present.
Proceedings before a justice under s. 443 are part and parcel of criminal investigative procedure and are not analogous to trial proceedings which are generally required to be conducted in open court. The opening to public inspection of the documents before the justice is not equivalent to the right of the public to attend and witness proceedings in court. Access to these documents should be restricted to persons who can show a direct and tangible interest in the documents. There is no general right to inspect search warrants and the informations relating thereto.
[Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd., [1980] 2 W.L.R. 1; R. v. Solloway Mills & Co., [1930] 3 D.L.R. 293; Realty Renovations Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Alberta et al. (1978), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 249;
[page 177]
Southam Publishing Company v. Mack (1959-60), 2 Crim. L.Q. 119; Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978), 98 S. Ct. 1306; R. v. Wright, 8 T.R. 293; Gazette Printing Co. v. Shallow (1909), 41 S.C.R. 339; Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417; McPherson v. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177, referred to.]
APPEAL from a judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 289, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 161, 38 N.S.R. (2d) 633, 69 A.P.R. 633, dismissing an appeal from a judgment of Richard J. Appeal dismissed, Martland, Ritchie, Beetz and Estey JJ. dissenting.
Reinhold M. Endres and Mollie Gallagher, for the appellants.
Robert Murrant and Gordon Proudfoot, for the respondent.
J. A. Scollin, Q.C., and S. R. Fainstein, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
S. Casey Hill, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario.
Ronald Schacter, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Eugene D. Westhaver, for the intervener the Attorney General for New Brunswick.
E. Robert A. Edwards, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.
Kenneth W. MacKay, for the intervener the Attorney General for Saskatchewan.
Y. Roslak, Q.C., and Lloyd Nelson, for the intervener the Attorney General for Alberta.
Alan D. Gold, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
The judgment of Laskin Cl and Dickson, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ. was delivered by
DICKSON J.—The appellant, Ernest Harold Grainger, is Chief Clerk of the Provincial Magistrate's Court at Halifax and also a Justice of the Peace. In the latter capacity he had occasion to issue certain search warrants. The respondent, Linden MacIntyre, is a television journalist
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employed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. At the material time Mr. MacIntyre was researching a story on political patronage and fund raising. Mr. MacIntyre asked Mr. Grainger to show him the search warrants and supporting material. Mr. Grainger refused, on the ground that such material was not available for inspection by the general public. Mr. MacIntyre commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Trial Division, for an order that search warrants and informations relating thereto, issued pursuant to s. 443 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, or other related or similar statutes, are a matter of public record and may be inspected by a member of the public upon reasonable request.
Mr. Justice Richard of the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia delivered reasons approving Mr. Maclntyre's application. He held that Mr. MacIntyre was entitled to a declaration to the effect that search warrants "which have been executed", and informations relating thereto, which are in the control of the justice of the peace or a court official are court records available for examination by members of the general public.
An appeal brought by the Attorney General of Nova Scotia and by Mr. Grainger to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia was dismissed. The Appeal Division proceeded on much broader grounds than Richard J. The order dismissing the appeal contained a declaration "that a member of the public is entitled to inspect informations upon which search warrants have been issued pursuant to section 443 of the Criminal Code of Canada". The Court also declared that Mr. MacIntyre was entitled to be present in open court when the search warrants were issued. This right, the Appeal Division said, extended to any member of the public, including individuals who would be the subjects of the search warrants.
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This Court granted leave to appeal the judgment and order of the Appeal Division. The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorneys General of the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Alberta intervened to support the appellant Attorney General of Nova Scotia. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association intervened in support of Mr. Maclntyre.
Although Mr. MacIntyre happens to be a journalist employed by the C.B.C. he has throughout taken the position that his standing is no higher than that of any member of the general public. He claims no special status as a journalist.
II
A search warrant may be broadly defined as an order issued by a justice under statutory powers, authorizing a named person to enter a specified place to search for and seize specified property which will afford evidence of the actual or intended commission of a crime. A warrant may issue upon a sworn information and proof of reasonable grounds for its issuance. The property seized must be carried before the justice who issued the warrant to be dealt with by him according to law.
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Search warrants are part of the investigative pretrial process of the criminal law, often employed early in the investigation and before the identity of all of the suspects is known. Parliament, in furtherance of the public interest in effective investigation and prosecution of crime, and through the enactment of s. 443 of the Code, has legalized what would otherwise be an illegal entry of premises and illegal seizure of property. The issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act on the part of the justice, usually performed ex parte and in camera, by the very nature of the proceedings.
The search warrant in recent years has become an increasingly important investigatory aid, as crime and criminals become increasingly sophisticated and the incidence of corporate white collar crime multiplies. The effectiveness of any search made pursuant to the issuance of a search warrant will depend much upon timing, upon the degree of confidentiality which attends the issuance of the warrant and upon the element of surprise which attends the search.
As is often the case in a free society there are at work two conflicting public interests. The one has to do with civil liberties and the protection of the individual from interference with the enjoyment of his property. There is a clear and important social value in avoidance of arbitrary searches and unlawful seizures. The other, competing, interest lies in the effective detection and proof of crime and the prompt apprehension and conviction of offenders. Public protection, afforded by efficient and effective law enforcement, is enhanced through the proper use of search warrants.
In this balancing of interests, Parliament has made a clear policy choice. The public interest in the detection, investigation and prosecution of crimes has been permitted to dominate the individual interest. To the extent of its reach, s. 443 has been introduced as an aid in the administration of justice and enforcement of the provisions of the Criminal Code.
III
The Criminal Code gives little guidance on the question of accessibility to the general public of search warrants and the underlying informations. And there is little authority on the point. The appellant Attorney General of Nova Scotia relied upon Taylor's Treatise on the Law of Evidence (11th ed. 1920), upon a footnote to Order 63, Rule 4 of the English Rules of Court, and upon Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd., [1980] 2 W.L.R. 1. These authorities indicate that under English practice there is no general right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents. The right is only exerciseable when some direct
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and tangible interest or proprietary right in the documents can be demonstrated.
It does seem clear that an individual who is 'directly interested' in the warrant can inspect the information and the warrant after the warrant has been executed. The reasoning here is that an interested party has a right to apply to set aside or quash a search warrant based on a defective information (R. v. Solloway Mills & Co., [1930] 3 D.L.R. 293 (Alta. S.C.)). This right can only be exercised if the applicant is entitled to inspect the warrant and the information immediately after it has been executed. The point is discussed by Mr. Justice MacDonald of the Alberta Supreme Court in Realty Renovations Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Alberta et al. (1978), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 249 at pp. 253-54:
Since the issue of a search warrant is a judicial act and not an administrative act, it appears to me to be fundamental that in order to exercise the right to question the validity of a search warrant, the interested party or his counsel must be able to inspect the search warrant and the information on which it is based. Although there is no appeal from the issue of a search warrant, a superior Court has the right by prerogative writ to review the act of the Justice of the Peace in issuing the warrant. In order to launch a proper application, the applicant should know the reasons or grounds for his application, which reasons or grounds are most likely to be found in the form of the information or warrant. I am unable to conceive anything but a denial of Justice if the contents of the information and warrant, after the warrant is executed, are hidden until the police have completed the investigation or until the Crown prosecutor decides that access to the file containing the warrant is to be allowed. Such a restriction could effectively delay, if not prevent review of the judicial act of the Justice in the issue of the warrant. If a warrant is void then it should be set aside as soon as possible and the earlier the application to set it aside can be heard, the more the right of the individual is protected.
The appellant, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, does not contest the right of an 'interested party' to inspect search warrants and informations after execution. His contention is that Mr. MacIntyre, a member of the general public, not directly affected by issuance of the warrant, has no right of inspection. The question, therefore, is whether, in
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law, any distinction can be drawn, in respect of accessibility, between those persons who might be termed 'interested parties' and those members of the public who are unable to show any special interest in the proceedings.
There would seem to be only two Canadian cases which have addressed the point. In (1959-60), 2 Crim. L.Q., 119, reference is made to an unreported decision of Greschuk J. in Southam Publishing Company v. Mack in Supreme Court Chambers in Calgary, Alberta. Mandamus was granted requiring a magistrate to permit a reporter of the Calgary Herald to inspect the information and complaints which were in his possession relating to cases the magistrate had dealt with on a particular date.
In Realty Renovations Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Alberta, supra, MacDonald J. concluded his judgment with these words:
I further declare that upon execution of the search warrant, the information in support and the warrant are matters of Court Record and are available for inspection on demand.
It is only fair to observe, however, that in that case the person seeking access was an "interested party" and therefore the broad declaration, quoted above, strictly speaking went beyond what was required for the decision.
American courts have recognized a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. Such common law right has been recognized, for example, in courts of the District of Columbia (Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978), 98 S. Ct. 1306). In that case Mr. Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, observed at p. 1311:
Both petitioner and respondents acknowledge the existence of a common-law right of access to judicial records, but they differ sharply over its scope and the circumstances warranting restrictions of it. An infrequent subject of litigation, its contours have not been delineated with any precision.
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Later, at p. 1312, Mr. Justice Powell said:
The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found, for example, in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, see, e.g., State ex rel. Colscott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 621-627, 57 N.E. 535, 536-538 (1900); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336-339 (1879), and in a newspaper publisher's intention to publish information concerning the operation of government, see, e.g., State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis.2d 672, 677, 137 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1965), modified on other grounds, 28 Wis.2d 685a, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1966). But see Burton v. Reynolds, 110 Mich. 354, 68 N.W. 217 (1896).
By reason of the relatively few judicial decisions it is difficult, and probably unwise, to attempt any comprehensive definition of the right of access to judicial records or delineation of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether access is to be permitted. The question before us is limited to search warrants and informations. The response to that question, it seems to me, should be guided by several broad policy considerations, namely, respect for the privacy of the individual, protection of the administration of justice, implementation of the will of Parliament that a search warrant be an effective aid in the investigation of crime, and finally, a strong public policy in favour of "openness" in respect of judicial acts. The rationale of this last-mentioned consideration has been eloquently expressed by Bentham in these terms:
'In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.' 'Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.'
The concern for accountability is not diminished by the fact that the search warrants might be issued by a justice in camera. On the contrary, this fact increases the policy argument in favour of accessibility. Initial secrecy surrounding the issuance of warrants may lead to abuse, and publicity
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is a strong deterrent to potential malversation.
In short, what should be sought is maximum accountability and accessibility but not to the extent of harming the innocent or of impairing the efficiency of the search warrant as a weapon in society's never-ending fight against crime.
IV
The appellant, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, says in effect that the search warrants are none of Mr. Maclntyre's business. MacIntyre is not directly interested in the sense that his premises have been the object of a search. Why then should he be entitled to see them?
There are two principal arguments advanced in support of the position of the appellant. The first might be termed the 'privacy' argument. It is submitted that the privacy rights of the individuals who have been the object of searches would be violated if persons like Mr. MacIntyre were permitted to inspect the warrants. It is argued that the warrants are issued merely on proof of 'reasonable grounds' to believe that there is evidence with respect to the commission of a criminal offence in a "building, receptacle or place". At this stage of the proceedings no criminal charge has been laid and there is no assurance that a charge ever will be laid. Moreover, search warrants are often issued to search the premises of a third party who is in no way privy to any wrongdoing, but is in possession of material necessary to the inquiry. Why, it is asked, submit these individuals to embarrassment and public suspicion through release of search warrants?
The second, independent, submission of the appellant might be termed the 'administration of justice' argument. It is suggested that the effectiveness of the search warrant procedure depends to a large extent on the element of surprise. If the occupier of the premises were informed in advance of the warrant, he would dispose of the goods. Therefore, the public must be denied access to the warrants, otherwise the legislative purposes and
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intention of Parliament, embodied in s. 443 of the Criminal Code, would be frustrated.
V
Let me deal first with the 'privacy' argument. This is not the first occasion on which such an argument has been tested in the courts. Many times it has been urged that the 'privacy' of litigants requires that the public be excluded from court proceedings. It is now well established, however, that covertness is the exception and openness the rule. Public confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration of justice are thereby fostered. As a general rule the sensibilities of the individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the public from judicial proceedings. The following comments of Laurence J. in R. v. Wright, 8 T.R. 293, are apposite and were cited with approval by Duff J. in Gazette Printing Co. v. Shallow (1909), 41 S.C.R. 339 at p. 359:
Though the publication of such proceedings may be to the disadvantage of the particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the public that the proceedings of courts of justice should be universally known. The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings.
The leading case is the decision of the House of Lords in Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417. In the later case of McPherson v. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177, at p. 200, Lord Blanesburgh, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, referred to "publicity" as the "authentic hallmark of judicial as distinct from administrative procedure".
It is, of course, true that Scott v. Scott and McPherson v. McPherson were cases in which proceedings had reached the stage of trial whereas the issuance of a search warrant takes place at the pre-trial investigative stage. The cases mentioned, however, and many others which could be cited, establish the broad principle of "openness" in judicial proceedings, whatever their nature, and in the exercise of judicial powers. The same policy considerations
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upon which is predicated our reluctance to inhibit accessibility at the trial stage are still present and should be addressed at the pretrial stage. Parliament has seen fit, and properly so, considering the importance of the derogation from fundamental common law rights, to involve the judiciary in the issuance of search warrants and the disposition of the property seized, if any. I find it difficult to accept the view that a judicial act performed during a trial is open to public scrutiny but a judicial act performed at the pretrial stage remains shrouded in secrecy.
The reported cases have not generally distinguished between judicial proceedings which are part of a trial and those which are not. Ex parte applications for injunctions, interlocutory proceedings, or preliminary inquiries are not trial proceedings, and yet the 'open court' rule applies in these cases. The authorities have held that subject to a few well-recognized exceptions, as in the case of infants, mentally disordered persons or secret processes, all judicial proceedings must be held in public. The editor of Halsbury's 4th Edition states the rule in these terms:
In general, all cases, both civil and criminal, must be heard in open court, but in certain exceptional cases, where the administration of justice would be rendered impracticable by the presence of the public, the court may sit in camera [Vol. 10, para. 705, at p. 316].
At every stage the rule should be one of public accessibility and concomitant judicial accountability; all with a view to ensuring there is no abuse in the issue of search warrants, that once issued they are executed according to law, and finally that any evidence seized is dealt with according to law. A decision by the Crown not to prosecute, notwithstanding the finding of evidence appearing to establish the commission of a crime may, in some circumstances, raise issues of public importance.
In my view, curtailment of public accessibility can only be justified where there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate
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importance. One of these is the protection of the innocent.
Many search warrants are issued and executed, and nothing is found. In these circumstances, does the interest served by giving access to the public outweigh that served in protecting those persons whose premises have been searched and nothing has been found? Must they endure the stigmatization to name and reputation which would follow publication of the search? Protection of the innocent from unnecessary harm is a valid and important policy consideration. In my view that consideration overrides the public access interest in those cases where a search is made and nothing is found. The public right to know must yield to the protection of the innocent. If the warrant is executed and something is seized, other considerations come to bear.
VI
That brings me to the second argument raised by the appellant. The point taken here is that the effective administration of justice would be frustrated if individuals were permitted to be present when the warrants were issued. Therefore, the proceeding must be conducted in camera, as an exception to the open court principle. I agree. The effective administration of justice does justify the exclusion of the public from the proceedings attending the actual issuance of the warrant. The Attorneys General have established, at least to my satisfaction, that if the application for the warrant were made in open court the search for the instrumentalities of crime would, at best, be severely hampered and, at worst, rendered entirely fruitless. In a process in which surprise and secrecy may play a decisive role the occupier of the premises to be searched would be alerted, before the execution of the warrant, with the probable consequence of destruction or removal of evidence. I agree with counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario that the presence in an open courtroom of members of the public, media personnel, and, potentially, contacts of suspected accused in respect of whom the search is to be made, would
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render the mechanism of a search warrant utterly useless.
None of the counsel before us sought to sustain the position of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia that the issue of the search warrant is a judicial act which should be performed in open court by a justice of the peace with the public present. The respondent Mr. MacIntyre stated in paragraph 5 of his factum:
One must note that the Respondent never sought documentation relating to unexecuted search warrants nor did he ever request to be present during the decision making process .. .
It appeared clear during argument that the act of issuing the search warrant is, in practice, rarely, if ever, performed in open court. Search warrants are issued in private at all hours of the day or night, in the chambers of the justice by day or in his home by night. Section 443(1) of the Code seems to recognize the possibility of exigent situations in stating that a justice may "at any time" issue a warrant.
Although the rule is that of "open court" the rule admits of the exception referred to in Halsbury, namely, that in exceptional cases, where the administration of justice would be rendered impracticable by the presence of the public, the court may sit in camera. The issuance of a search warrant is such a case.
In my opinion, however, the force of the 'administration of justice' argument abates once the warrant has been executed, i.e. after entry and search. There is thereafter a "diminished interest in confidentiality" as the purposes of the policy of secrecy are largely, if not entirely, accomplished. The need for continued concealment virtually disappears. The appellant concedes that at this point individuals who are directly 'interested' in the warrant have a right to inspect it. To that extent at least it enters the public domain. The appellant must, however, in some manner, justify granting access to the individuals directly concerned, while denying access to the public in general. I can find no compelling reason for distinguishing between
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the occupier of the premises searched and the public. The curtailment of the traditionally uninhibited accessibility of the public to the working of the courts should be undertaken with the greatest reluctance.
The 'administration of justice' argument is based on the fear that certain persons will destroy evidence and thus deprive the police of the fruits of their search. Yet the appellant agrees these very individuals (i.e. those 'directly interested') have a right to see the warrant, and the material upon which it is based, once it has been executed. The appellants do not argue for blanket confidentiality with respect to warrants. Logically, if those directly interested can see the warrant, a third party who has no interest in the case at all is not a threat to the administration of justice. By definition, he has no evidence that he can destroy. Concern for preserving evidence and for the effective administration of justice cannot justify excluding him.
Undoubtedly every court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose. The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.
I am not unaware that the foregoing may seem a departure from English practice, as I understand it, but it is in my view more consonant with the openness of judicial proceedings which English case law would seem to espouse.
VII
I conclude that the administration of justice argument does justify an in camera proceeding at the time of issuance of the warrant but, once the warrant has been executed, exclusion thereafter of members of the public cannot normally be countenanced.
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The general rule of public access must prevail, save in respect of those whom I have referred to as innocent persons.
I would dismiss the appeal and vary the declaration of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to read as follows:
IT IS DECLARED that after a search warrant has been executed, and objects found as a result of the search are brought before a justice pursuant to s. 446 of the Criminal Code, a member of the public is entitled to inspect the warrant and the information upon which the warrant has been issued pursuant to s. 443 of the Code.
There will be no costs in this Court.
The reasons of Martland, Ritchie, Beetz and Estey JJ. were delivered by
MARTLAND J. (dissenting)—T his appeal is from a judgment of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. The facts which gave rise to the case are not in dispute.
The appellant, Ernest Harold Grainger, is Chief Clerk of the Provincial Magistrate's Court at Halifax and is also a Justice of the Peace. The respondent is a television journalist employed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation who, at the material time, was researching a story on political patronage and fund raising. He asked the appellant, Grainger, to show him certain search warrants and supporting material and was refused on the ground that such material was not available for inspection by the general public.
The respondent gave notice to the appellants of an intended application in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Trial Division, for "an Order in the nature of mandamus and/or a declaratory judgment to the effect that the search warrants and Informations relating thereto issued pursuant to Section 443 of the Criminal Code of Canada or other related or similar statutes are a matter of public record and may be inspected by a member of the public upon reasonable request".
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The application was heard by Richard J. who ordered that the respondent "is entitled to a declaration to the effect that the Search Warrants and Informations relating thereto which have been executed upon and which are in the control of a Justice of the Peace or a Court Official are court records and are available for examination by members of the general public." It will be noted that this order was limited to search warrants which had been executed.
The appellants appealed unsuccessfully to the Appeal Division. The judgment dismissing the appeal contained the following declaration:
IT IS DECLARED that a member of the public is entitled to inspect informations upon which search warrants have been issued pursuant to section 443 of the Criminal Code of Canada.
This declaration was broader in its scope than that made by Richard J. in that it was not limited to search warrants which had been executed. The basis for the Court's decision is set forth in the following paragraph of the reasons for judgment:
In my opinion any member of the public does have a right to inspect informations upon which search warrants are based, pursuant to s. 443 of the Criminal Code, since the issue of the search warrant is a judicial act performed in open court by a justice of the peace. The public would be entitled to be present on that occasion and to hear the contents of the information presented to the justice when he is requested to exercise his discretion in the granting of the warrant. The information has become part of the record of the court as revealed at a public hearing and must be available for inspection by members of the public.
Subsection (1)
of s. 443 of the Criminal Code provides:
443. (1) A justice who is satisfied by information upon oath in Form 1, that there is reasonable ground to believe that there is in a building, receptacle or place
(a) anything upon or in respect of which any offence against this Act has been or is suspected to have been committed,
(b) anything that there is reasonable ground to believe will afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence against this Act, or
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(c) anything that there is reasonable ground to believe is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any offence against the person for which a person may be arrested without warrant,
may at any time issue a warrant under his hand authorizing a person named therein or a peace officer to search the building, receptacle or place for any such thing, and to seize and carry it before the justice who issued the warrant or some other justice for the same territorial division to be dealt with by him according to law.
Section 446 of the Criminal Code provides that anything seized under a search warrant issued pursuant to s. 443 and brought before a justice shall be detained by him or he may order that it be detained until the conclusion of any investigation or until required to be produced for the purpose of a preliminary inquiry or trial.
Subsection (5) of s. 446 provides: 446... .
(5) Where anything is detained under subsection (1), a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or of a court of criminal jurisdiction may, on summary application on behalf of a person who has an interest in what is detained, after three clear days notice to the Attorney General, order that the person by or on whose behalf the application is made be permitted to examine anything so detained.
The appellants, by leave of this Court, have appealed from the judgments of the Appeal Division. The two issues stated by the appellants are as follows:
(i) Are search warrants issued pursuant to Section 443 of the Criminal Code issued in open court and are they and the informations pertaining thereto consequently documents open for public inspection,
(ii) Whether there is otherwise a general right to inspect search warrants and the informations pertaining thereto.
With respect to the first issue, I am in agreement with my brother Dickson, for the reasons which he has given, that the broad declaration made by the Appeal Division cannot be sustained.
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That being so, the respondent cannot assert a right to examine the search warrants and the related informations on the basis that the issuance of the search warrants was a judicial act in open court with a right for the public to be present.
That brings us to the second issue defined by the appellants as to whether there is a general right to inspect search warrants and the informations pertaining thereto. This was the real basis of the submission of the respondent who did not seek to sustain the position taken by the Appeal Division. His position is that search warrants issued under s. 443 and the informations pertaining thereto are court documents which are open to general public inspection.
The respondent relies upon an ancient English statute enacted in 1372, 46 Edward III. An English translation of this Act, which was enacted in law French, appears in a note at the end of the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in Caddy v. Barlow (1827), 1 Man. & Ry. 275 at pp. 279-80. I will quote that part of the note which includes the statutory provision:
It appears that originally all judicial records of the King's Courts were open to the public without restraint, and were preserved for that purpose. Lord Coke, in his preface to 3 Co. Rep. 3, speaking on this subject says, "these records, for that they contain great and hidden treasure, are faithfully and safely kept, (as they well deserve), in the king's treasury. And yet not so kept but that any subject may for his necessary use and benefit have access thereunto; which was the ancient law of England, and so is declared by an act of Parliament in 46 Edw. 3, in these words: Also the Commons pray, that, whereas records, and whatsoever is in the King's Court, ought of reason to remain there, for perpetual evidence and aid of all parties thereto, and of all those whom in any manner they reach, when they have need; and yet of late they refuse, in the Court of our said Lord, to make search or exemplification of any thing which can fall in evidence against the King, or in his disadvantage. May it please (you) to ordain by statute, that search and exemplification be made for all persons (fait as touts gentz) of whatever record touches them in any manner, as well as that which falls against the King
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as other persons. Le Roy le voet."
The respondent cites this legislation in support of the proposition that a member of the public has access to all judicial records. However, the provisions of the statute did not go that far. It referred to "whatever record touches them in any manner". (Emphasis added.) I take this as meaning that to obtain the benefit of the statute the person had to show that the document sought to be searched in some way affected his interests.
This view is supported by the portion of the footnote which precedes the quotation of the statute. Lord Coke states that any subject may have access to the records "for his necessary use and benefit".
The case of Caddy v. Barlow itself related to the admissibility, in an action for malicious prosecution, of a copy of an indictment against the plaintiff which had been granted to her brother, the co-accused.
The respondent refers to the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in The Attorney-General v. Scully (1902), 4 O.L.R. 394, in which reference is made to Caddy v. Barlow and to the English statute. That case dealt with an application made to the clerk of the peace for a copy of the indictment in a criminal charge of theft against the applicant who had been acquitted. He obviously had an interest in obtaining the document.
The Appeal Division in the present case which, as previously noted, based its decision to permit the examination of the search warrants and informations upon its conclusion that these documents were produced at a judicial hearing in open court, did deal with the assertion of a general right to examine court documents in the following passage in its reasons;
In my opinion at common law courts have always exercised control over their process in open court and access to the records. Although the public have a right to any information they may gleam [sic] from attendance at a public hearing of a process in open court, and to those parts of the record that are part of the public presentation of the judicial proceeding in open court
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there have always been some parts of the court file that are available only to "persons interested" and this "interest" must be established to the satisfaction of the court. Parties to civil actions and the accused in criminal proceedings have always been held by the courts to be persons so interested. Other persons must establish their right to see particular documents before being entitled to do so.
The Appeal Division cited in its reasons paragraphs 1492 and 1493 of Taylor on Evidence, 11th ed. (The same paragraphs appear with the same numbers in the 12th edition):
1492. It is highly questionable whether the records of inferior tribunals are open to the inspection of all persons without distinction; but it is clear that everyone has a right to inspect and take copies of the parts of the proceedings in which he is individually interested. The party, therefore, who wishes to examine any particular record of one of those courts, should first apply to that court, showing that he has some interest in the document in question, and that he requires it for a proper purpose. 1f his application be refused, the Chancery, or the King's Bench Division of the High Court, upon affidavit of the fact, may send either for the record itself or an exemplification; or the latter court will, by mandamus, obtain for the applicant the inspection or copy required. Thus, where a person, after having been convicted by a magistrate under the game laws, had an action brought against him for the same offence, the Court of Queen's Bench held that he was entitled to a copy of the conviction; and the magistrate having refused to give him one, they granted a writ of certiorari, for the mere purpose of procuring a copy, and of thus enabling the defendant to defeat the action. So, where a party, who had been sued in a court of conscience and had been taken in execution, brought an action of trespass and false imprisonment, the judges granted him a rule to inspect so much of the book of the proceedings as related to the suit against himself.
1493. Indeed, it may be laid down as a general rule, that the King's Bench Division will enforce by mandamus the production of every document of a public nature, in which any one of his Majesty's subjects can prove himself to be interested. Every officer, therefore, appointed by law to keep records ought to deem himself a trustee for all interested parties, and allow them to
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inspect such documents as concern themselves,—without putting them to the expense and trouble of making a formal application for a mandamus. But the applicant must show that he has some direct and tangible interest in the documents sought to be inspected, and that the inspection is bona fide required on some special and public ground, or the court will not interfere in his favour; and therefore, if his object be merely to gratify a rational curiosity, or to obtain information on some general subject, or to ascertain facts which may be indirectly useful to him in some ulterior proceedings, he cannot claim inspection as a right capable of being enforced.
The first edition of this work was published in 1848, and so these propositions may be taken as representing the author's views of the law of England on this subject.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 1, para. 97, a similar statement of the law appears:
The applicant's interest in the documents must be direct and tangible. Neither curiosity, even though rational, nor the ascertainment of facts which may be useful for furthering some ulterior object, constitutes a sufficient interest to bring an applicant within the rule on which the court acts in granting a mandamus for the inspection of public documents.
Although reasonable grounds must be shown for requiring inspection, it is not necessary to show as a ground for the application for a mandamus to inspect documents that a suit has been actually instituted. It will suffice to show that there is some particular matter in dispute and that the applicant is interested therein.
It is quite clear that the respondent has no direct and tangible interest in the documents which he sought to examine. He wished to examine them to further an ulterior object, i.e. for the purpose of preparing a news story. Applying the rule applicable under English law, the appellant, Grainger, was entitled to refuse his request.
It is suggested that a broader right might be recognized consonant with the openness of judicial proceedings. This suggestion requires a consideration of the nature of the proceedings provided for in s. 443. That section provides a means whereby persons engaged in the enforcement of criminal law may obtain leave, inter alia, to search buildings, receptacles or places and seize documents or
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other things which may afford evidence with respect to the commission of a criminal offence. A justice is empowered by the section to authorize this to be done. Before giving such authority, he must be satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for believing that there is in the building, receptacle or place anything in respect of which an offence has been committed or is suspected to have been committed; anything that there is reasonable ground to believe will afford evidence of the commission of a criminal offence; or anything that there is reasonable ground to believe is intended to be used for the commission of an offence against the person for which a person may be arrested without warrant.
The function of the justice may be considered to be a judicial function, but might more properly be described as a function performed by a judicial officer, since no notice is required to anyone, there is no opposite party before him and, in fact, in the case of a search before proceedings are instituted, no opposite party exists. There is no requirement that the justice should perform his function in court. The justice does not adjudicate, nor does he make any order. His power is to give authority to do certain things which are a part of pretrial preparation by the Crown. No provision is made in either s. 443 or s. 446 for an examination by anyone of the documents on the basis of which the justice issued a search warrant.
As the function of the justice is not adjudicative and is not performed in open court, cases dealing with the requirement of court proceedings being carried on in public, such as Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417, and McPherson v. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177, are not, in my opinion, relevant to the issue before the Court. The documents which the respondent seeks to examine are not documents filed in court proceedings. They are the necessary requirements which enable the justice to grant permission for the Crown to pursue its investigation of possible crimes and to prepare for criminal proceedings.
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If the documents in question in this appeal are not subject to public examination prior to the execution of the search warrants, I see no logical reason why they should become subject to such examination thereafter, at least until the case in respect of which the search has been made has come to trial. It is true that a search of those documents before the search warrant has been executed might frustrate the very purpose for which the warrant was issued by forewarning the person whose premises were to be searched. The element of surprise is essential to the proper enforcement of the criminal law. There are, however, additional and important reasons why such documents should not be made public which continue even after the warrant has been executed.
The information upon oath on the basis of which a search warrant may be issued is in Form 1 contained in Part XXV of the Criminal Code. It requires a description of the offence in respect of which the search is to be made. The informant must state that he has reasonable grounds for believing that the things for which the search is to be made are in a particular place and must state the grounds for such belief. This document, which may be submitted to the justice before any charges have been laid, discloses the informant's statement that an offence has been committed or is intended to be committed.
The disclosure of such information before trial could be prejudicial to the fair trial of the person suspected of having committed such crime. Publication of such information prior to trial is even more serious.
In R. v. Fisher (1811), 2 Camp. 563, 170 E.R. 1253, a prosecution was instituted for criminal libel in consequence of the publication by the defendants of the preliminary examinations taken ex parte before a magistrate prior to the committal for trial of the plaintiff on a charge of assault with intent to rape. In his judgment, Lord Ellenborough said, at p. 570:
If anything is more important than another in the administration of justice, it is that jurymen should come to the trial of those persons on whose guilt or innocence they are to decide, with minds pure and unprejudiced. Is it possible they should do so, after having read for weeks
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and months before, ex parte statements of the evidence against the accused, which the latter had no opportunity to disprove or to controvert? ... The publication of proceedings in courts of justice, where both sides are heard, and matters are finally determined, is salutary, and therefore it is permitted. The publication of these preliminary examinations has a tendency to pervert the public mind, and to disturb the course of justice; and it is therefore illegal.
Inspection of the information and the search warrant would enable the person inspecting the documents to discover the identity of the informant. In certain types of cases this might well place the informant in jeopardy. It was this kind of risk which led to the recognition in law of the right of the police to protect from disclosure the identity of police informants. That right exists even where a police officer is testifying at a trial. The same kind of risk arises in relation to persons who give information leading to the issuance of a search warrant. For the same reasons which justify the police in refusing to disclose the identity of an informer, public disclosure of documents from which the identity of the informant may be ascertained should not be compelled.
In his reasons, my brother Dickson has referred to the fact that in recent years the search warrant has become an increasingly important investigatory aid as crime and criminals become increasingly sophisticated and has pointed out that the effectiveness of a search pursuant to a search warrant depends, inter alia, on the degree of confidentiality which attends the issuance of the warrant. To insure such confidentiality, it is essential that criminal organizations, such as those involved in the drug traffic, should be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining the means to discover the identity of persons assisting the police.
Apart from the protection of the identity of the person furnishing the information upon which the issuance of a search warrant is founded, it is undesirable, in the public interest, that those engaged in criminal activities should have available to them information which discloses the pattern of police activities in connection with searches. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v.
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Rossminster Ltd., [1980] 2 W.L.R. 1, the House of Lords considered the validity of a search warrant procured pursuant to an English statute, the Taxes Management Act 1970, 1970 (U.K.), c. 9. The warrant was obtained because of suspected tax frauds. When executed, the occupants of the premises were not told the offences alleged or the "reasonable ground" on which the judge issuing the warrant had acted. In his reasons for judgment, Lord Wilberforce said, at pp. 37-38:
But, on the plain words of the enactment, the officers are entitled if they can persuade the board and the judge, to enter and search premises regardless of whom they belong to: a warrant which confers this power is strictly and exactly within the parliamentary authority, and the occupier has no answer to it. I accept that some information as regards the person(s) who are alleged to have committed an offence and possibly as to the approximate dates of the offences must almost certainly have been laid before the board and the judge. But the occupier has no right to be told of this at this stage, nor has he the right to be informed of the "reasonable grounds" of which the judge was satisfied. Both courts agree as to this: all this information is clearly protected by the public interest immunity which covers investigations into possible criminal offences. With reference to the police, Lord Reid stated this in these words:
"The police are carrying on an unending war with criminals many of whom are today highly intelligent. So it is essential that there should be no disclosure of anything which might give any useful information to those who organise criminal activities. And it would generally be wrong to require disclosure in a civil case of anything which might be material in a pending prosecution: but after a verdict has been given or it has been decided to take no proceedings there is not the same need for secrecy." (Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910, at pp. 953-954.)
The release to the public of the contents of informations and search warrants may also be harmful to a person whose premises are permitted to be searched and who may have no personal connection with the commission of the offence. The fact that his premises are the subject of a search warrant generates suspicion that he was in some way involved in the offence. Publication of
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the fact that such a warrant had been issued in respect of his premises would be highly prejudicial to him.
For these reasons, I am not satisfied that there is any valid reason for departing from the rule as stated in Halsbury (supra) so as to afford to the general public the right to inspect documents forming part of the search warrant procedure under s. 443.
In summary, my conclusion is that proceedings before a justice under s. 443 being part and parcel of criminal investigative procedure are not analogous to trial proceedings, which are generally required to be conducted in open court. The opening to public inspection of the documents before the justice is not equivalent to the right of the public to attend and witness proceedings in court. Access to these documents should be restricted, in accordance with the practice established in England, to persons who can show an interest in the documents which is direct and tangible. Clearly the respondent had no such interest.
I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of Richard J. In accordance with the submission of the appellants, there should be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed, MARTLAND, RITCHIE, BEETZ and ESTEY JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors for the appellants: Reinhold M. Endres and Mollie Gallagher, Halifax.
Solicitors for the respondent: Robert Murrant and Gordon Proudfoot, Dartmouth.